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1. Introduction
This article analyses a set of bids submitted to the
electricity spot market by three Norwegian reservoir
hydro producers in four two week periods in 2011. Our
objective is to provide insight into actual bidding, and our
findings indicate that there is scope for improved
efficiency. Not all marginal costs are taken into account,
possibly leading to overproduction at low prices.
Marginal costs seem in some cases to be overestimated at
high price levels, leading to planned underproduction in
scarcity situations. In summary, we document examples
of bidding that deviate from rational benchmarks.
As indicated, our contribution lies in analysing
bidding behavior empirically. This has been done for
electricity markets before [27, 25, 13]. However, their
purpose is to detect abuse of market power, whereas we
are looking for sub-optimal behavior for individual
producers. On the other hand, normative (optimization)
approaches to this problem abound, and here we cite a
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few. Refs. [6, 2] develop stochastic mixed integer
optimization models for production bidding given
uncertain prices. We extend [9] who develop piecewise
linear bidding curves for Nordic hydropower producers.
Also building on [9], [17] formulate the bidding
problem as an intraday problem considering bidding
into the day-ahead market, whereas the longer-term
interday problem is modeled as a Markov decision
process managing storage operations over time. Further,
[7, 5] optimize the day-ahead bidding for a generic set
of power plants in the same hydrological system.
Finally, [1] compares a stochastic bidding approach
with current best practice in the Nordic market. We refer
to [14, 16, 15] for wider reviews on bidding strategies,
including thermal generation.
The analysis is of interest to hydropower producers
who want to improve their bidding process. However, it
is also relevant for regulators and market analysts who
are doing market surveillance and day-ahead price
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ABSTRACT
We analyse bidding behavior in the Nordic electricity market, where producers submit supply
schedules for tomorrow’s generation in a day-ahead auction. We use the two-stage stochastic
mixed-integer linear program of Fleten and Kristoffersen (2007) [9] to generate efficient bids to
assist in the analysis. These bids are compared to those submitted by three Nordic reservoir
hydropower producers over four two week periods in 2011. Being price takers, the producers
maximize their profits by bidding their marginal cost. We find that the hydropower producers
often come close to the model-optimal result. However, not all marginal costs are taken into
account, possibly leading to overproduction at low prices. Marginal costs seem in some cases to
be overestimated at high production levels, leading to underproduction in those situations.
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analysis. Although our data is from one country only,
the day-ahead structure is common in many liberalised
electricity markets and so our results are of interest in a
wider setting, providing an in-depth picture of how day-
ahead bids are formed, and thus of the market micro-
structure of day-ahead markets.
The outline of the article is as follows. In Sections 2
and 3 we present the premises that flexible hydro
producers have to deal with when bidding day-ahead.
Section 4 presents the bids and gives the main empirical
analysis, structured around the producers’ decisions of
deciding the bid volumes, setting the price points and
deciding what type of bids to use, respectively. In
Section 5 we report on results from implementing a
stochastic optimization model for bidding, where
optimized bids are compared with actual ones. Finally,
we conclude in Section 6.
2. Physical Electricity Markets
Power producers have to choose where to sell their
physical power. However, besides bilateral agreements
with large industrial power consumers, the major
marketplace to trade large volumes of power is the day-
ahead auction. In total 334 TWh, or 77%, of the
electricity produced in the Nordic market was traded
through the day-ahead auction in 2012 [20]. The
corresponding numbers for EEX are; 321 TWh turnover
at the day-ahead market, i.e. about 28% of consumption.
At 12:00 noon both retailers and producers submit bids
to these two European day-ahead markets for buying or
selling electricity for the coming day, that is the next
12–36 hours. The participants can use several
combinations of prices and volumes for each hour, thus
creating a piecewise linear bid function, in addition to
other types of bids.
After receiving all bids, the market operators sets the
uniform system and zonal spot prices. At around
12:30–12:45 the prices are made public and a producer
will learn how large a volume he is committed to produce
for every hour the next day. All power producers and
suppliers have balancing responsibility, overseen by the
respective transmission system operator in each country.
If a producer for some reason cannot or does not want to
comply with the committed volume, he must make an
adjustment trade. For this purpose the market operators
also organizes intraday trading markets.
There still might be outages or other incidents that
cause deviations from the day- ahead (and intraday)
schedule. Therefore, there are balancing markets, where
the system operators accepts bids for upwards or
downwards ramping of production. In addition to the
balancing markets, system operators also coordinate
markets for primary reserves. The extent to which
bidding into one of these markets must be planned
together with bidding into other markets is an active
research question [23, 8,4].
Since producers can not be guaranteed any
production in the closer to real time markets, producers
looking to sell in an efficient market must necessarily
bid much of their power into the day-ahead. The
problem faced by the producers, hereby referred to as
the bidding problem, thus consists of how much power
to offer for tomorrow, at what prices and for which
hours through what type of bids. This problem is further
complicated by technical requirements and constraints
in physical production, variable feed-in fees to the grid
owner, as well as start up costs and variable efficiency
curves for the generating units.
As a price taker in a competitive market you achieve
your optimal outcome by offering your good to marginal
cost [12]. However, where thermal power plants can
relate their marginal costs to the cost of fuel,
hydropower producers get their water for free. For
flexible hydro producers, the marginal costs translates
into the opportunity cost of not being able to sell power
from this water at a later stage [22]. And determining the
latter part is far from easy, as value of an additional unit
of water in the reservoirs, the marginal water value,
depends on more than just future price expectations. It is
also dependent on the current reservoir level, local
inflow expectations and the size of reservoir compared
to it’s average inflow and production capacity [24, 19].
Next we outline some factors that affect how the bids
are formed in the context of a Norwegian hydropower
producer, namely transmission tariffs, license power,
marginal water value, efficiency curves of generating
units, and start up costs.
3. Internal Premises for Bidding
Power producers in Norway pay a fee when delivering
power to the electricity grid, from here on referred to as
the feed-in fee. This fee consists of a fixed part of 
1 EUR/MWh paid to the system operator, Statnett, and a
variable part paid to the grid owner. The fixed part of the
fee is set for several years at a time to cover costs for
Statnett and is equal for all power stations and all hours
of the week. The variable part equals the marginal loss
rate multiplied with the day-ahead price for every hour.
The marginal loss rate is set by the system operator on a
weekly basis to account for grid losses. If your
production is closer to the power drain, you might in fact
improve the grid situation by supplying the grid. Thus
the marginal loss rate can be both positive and negative.
The marginal loss rate is given as two different values
over the span of a week, one for weekdays
(07:00–22:00) and one for weekends and nights
(22:00–06:00). With regards to bidding, the fixed part
should not have any effect, whereas the variable part
should be added or subtracted in determining the price
points for every hour. Note that even though the rates are
given in advance, the price for the next day is still
unknown and day-ahead price variations will add
uncertainty to the fee payment.
Hydropower producers in Norway are required to
deliver up to 15% of the electricity production to the
local and county councils and to the state at an estimated
price set by the government [21]. This obligation is
known as license power. The arrangement ensures that
the local community benefits from the economic surplus
generated by the electricity production and trade. For
2011 the license power price is set at 13.35 EUR/MWh.
For certain producers this license power may be evident
in the bidding through buying power at very low prices,
simply for the possibility to cover the obligation through
purchases at a favourable price level compared to
producing it themselves.
The most important parameter when bidding
hydropower is the value of an additional unit of water in
a reservoir, the marginal water value, or simply the
water value. As a fully correct water value calculation is
complex, most producers use specialized software to
perform an approximate calculation [26]. Some do their
own simplified calculations in customized computer
programs or as simple functions of the reservoir levels.
We do not have exact water values for all three
producers, nor will we create our own models for
estimating them. However, through deduction it is
possible to infer the water values from the bids.
The bidding problem also relates to the efficiency of
the power plants and each separate turbine. The
efficiency ε at which a turbine runs can be given by its
power output, w, in MW divided by the flow of water, q,
also in MW: η = w (q)/q (at nominal water height and
flow). Modern turbines and generators are able to
convert up to 95% of the kinetic energy to electric
power. Both above and below best point the efficiency
usually drops a few percentage points, illustrated with
the concave curve in Figure 1a. Naturally, producers
want to run their turbines at best point for much of the
time. However, as the spot price rises so should the
producer’s willingness to produce above best point. On
the other hand, due to high start up costs or minimum
flow constraints, a producer might also end up
producing below best point.
When bidding for power stations with multiple
turbines, producers also have to consider the combined
efficiencies of two or more turbines. Depending on the
efficiency curves of the turbines, it might be better to run
three turbines at a certain point of production than two,
or vice versa. Figure 1b shows actual combined output
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(a) Efficiency curve for a single turbine related
to power output.
(b) Combined efficiency curves for one to four
identical turbines.
Figure 1: Efficiency and output curves for one and several combined turbines. The single efficiency curve shows the actual efficiency
relative to the power output while the multiple turbine curve shows output relative to the water inflow.
of one to four identical turbines relative to water inflow.
At a given flow of water, producers naturally want to get
the highest possible power output in return. In this case
we see a slight overlap when using one and two turbines,
and an increasing overlap when including more turbines.
Where the curves intersect, the producer is indifferent to
using one more (or one less) turbine. We will use the
term efficiency curve for both types of curves shown in
Figure 1 as they both are able to display the efficiency
of turbines.
If a producer starts a turbine from a stand-still, both
direct and indirect costs will occur. The direct costs
come in the form of inefficient use of water (for a few
seconds) and potential extra use of manpower, while the
indirect costs are wear and tear on the equipment and a
risk of a failure in the start up procedure. Although very
low compared to other power production technologies,
start up costs still have to be accounted for when running
a hydro plant.
Large hydropower producers have many power
stations, some with multiple turbines. After Nord Pool
Spot clears the market, producers are given a total
production commitment according to the spot price and
their submitted bids. Producers then need to plan their
allocation of the realized volume commitment across
their power plants and turbines in a way that minimizes
the total costs. At this point they usually run a
deterministic short term optimization, for instance
SHOP [11]. A stochastic approach is suggested by [10]
and developed further by [3]. Thus, the possibility of
post commitment production allocation favours big
producers with many power plants. In a sense, it
releaves some of the pressure on bidding optimally as,
with luck, even bidding somewhat poorly might in the
end result in a production scheme where every turbine
runs at a highly efficient output level. A further remedy
for unfortunate bidding and commitment is the intraday
market. Finally, penalties for imbalances in the
balancing market, although always positive, may not
always be substantial.
4. Bid Analysis
In the following section we present the empirical
analysis of the bids. First we give a summary of the bids
and other information we have received in 4.1. In 4.2 we
analyze the bids based on the underlying factors found
in Section 3. Finally, in Section 4.3 we analyse the
relative performance of the bidding for each producer,
over the whole data period.
4.1. Presentation of bid data
We have gathered a unique data set from three
Norwegian hydropower producers. This includes all
variations of bids submitted by the producers to Nord
Pool Spot for four two week periods representing four
seasons in 2011. Additionally, Producer A in particular
has provided us with highly detailed data regarding all
their cascades and power stations and thus enabled a
more extensive analysis of their bidding. The annual
electricity generation is less than 10 TWh for all of the
producers, placing them below top 10 among Nordic
producers, and below top 3 in Norway, regarding their
relative size. Table 1 gives a brief overview of the data
we have received from the three producers.
The hourly bid is the most common type of bidding
product used by Norwegian hydropower producers, and
is submitted to the market operator in matrices. The
hourly bid matrix can be quite large, spanning 24 rows
and up to 64 columns representing respectively the
hours and the price points. Actual bids are presented in
cut-outs of full matrices in Section 4.2 to illustrate and
support the analyses. However, to exemplify the
dimensions, the matrices are plotted along three axes in
Figure 2 below. We present three plots of these matrices,
one for each company, and each matrix with different
characteristics. For Producer A we also include a block
bid, i.e. a bid valid for several hours (here
18:00–22:00, for 40 MW), that will be accepted if and
only if the average spot price for those hours is above
18.75 EUR/MWh for this case.
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Table 1: Overview of the data received from producers A, B and C. A cascade is two or more sequential reservoirs and power
stations in the same hydrological system. H = regular hourly bids, B = block bids, L = linked blocks.
Indiv. power Bid types Water Efficiency 
Producer Scope station bids in use values curves
A All bids Yes H + B + L Yes Yes
B Cascade No H + B No No
C All bids No H + B No No
4.2. Patterns in the bids
We find that there are basically three decisions that a
bidder faces in the day-ahead auction. These are deciding
the volumes to bid, setting the exact price points you
want to bid in, and finally figuring out what type of bids
to use. We analyze the first two of these. Naturally, all
these decision are strongly interconnected. A producer
would likely never set a price point without having an
idea of which volume to connect it to. To clarify the
presentation they are still analyzed separately.
4.2.1. Deciding the volumes
The production volumes found in a bid matrix or a block
bid are naturally connected to the technical specifications
of the turbines a producer controls. Depending on the
price level and price expectations, a producer usually
wants to run his turbines at the minimum level, at best
point, at maximum capacity or somewhere in between
the latter two. These levels of production are fixed and do
not change unless the producer decides to physically alter
the design of the power station. Submitting sensible bids
thus consists mainly of setting a limited set of volumes at
strategic price points. However, a number of other
elements come into play when setting the volume points.
These include bilateral contracts, pumping and an
assessment of the maximum available capacity.
Bilateral agreements include the obligation to deliver
concession power, as well as directly to industrial
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(a) Bids a winter day for Producer A, including ablock of 40 MW from18:00 to 22:00 at price
18.75 EUR/MWh. The bid uses 37 price points in total. Most of the volume is bid at low
price levels, after which the bid flattens out. We also see how the drop in hourly bid volume
corresponds with the entrance of the block. 
(b) Bids a weekend summerday for Pro-
ducer B. The bids are quite stable through-
out the day. Volumes at the max. and min.
prices are constant over the day.
(c) Both demand and supply bids a spring day
for Producer C. At 40 EUR/MWh the bids
shift from buying to selling. We also see dis-
tinct volume shifts at hour 6 and hour 21.
Figure 2: Representative bids for Producer A, B and C, respectively.
consumers. We can therefore find bids in the bid
matrices where producers bid to purchase power at low
price levels. Further, purchase bids can also represent
bids to run pumping stations. Analysis of these two
issues is available upon request.
It might seem natural for a producer to bid the
combined technical capacity of all its turbines to Elspot
at the highest allowable price point of 2000 EUR/MWh.
However, this is not exactly the case. Assuming that the
producers want to produce as much power as they can at
the maximum price of 2000 EUR/MWh, the maximum
production capacity becomes the sum of the hourly bid
at maximum price and the submitted block bids in an
hour. A surprising finding is that the maximum bid
volume varies greatly, even in shorter periods of time
such as a week, or even a day. Figure 3 shows variations
in maximum capacities, with Figure 3a showing daily
average maximum output over the weeks. Variations on
hourly intervals for weeks 25–26 are shown in Figure
3b. There are a number of reasons for the observed
variation. Producers commit production in other markets
besides day-ahead spot as they see it best to reduce risk
and maximize profits, selling for example bilaterally to
power intensive industry, or setting aside capacity for
ancillary services markets. Additionally, hydropower
producers in Norway must deliver concession power at
at a varying level. In certain periods a producer can
experience reservoirs that are empty, or nearly empty, to
further disrupt the total output capacity. Maintenance is
another reason. Finally, the maximum output also
depends on the head of water which varies with the
reservoir level. All in all, these factors strongly affect
producers’ ability to deliver to Elspot. As we can see the
deviations for all producers are quite high.
4.2.2. Setting the right price points
Once a producer has established which volumes are
sensible to bid, he must figure out the right prices to
connect them to. The marginal water value is a typical
anchor at which the producers would want to bid their
best point volume. However this is necessarily not
sufficient. The producers also have to account for the
fact the Nord Pool Spot will interpolate their bids
between consecutive price points as well as the fact that
costs for feeding power onto the grid often are not
included in the water values. Additionally, at
sufficiently high price levels, producers will want to
produce above best point, and thus have to consider the
drop in efficiency relative to the increase in price points.
Most often, the spot price will not equal any of the
price points chosen by the producer. The exact hourly
bid commitment will then be an interpolated value
between volumes of the two neighboring price points.
Interpolation between bid points can be unfavorable
for the producers, because of the risk of committing to
produce in an infeasible or inefficient range. Table 2
illustrates how Producer C bids to avoid volume
interpolation. The price points in italics show his
marginal water values for four separate reservoirs
when all marginal costs are accounted for. If the spot
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Figure 3: Maximum production capacity bid to Elspot for producers A, B and C, showing high variations both within fortnightly and daily
time perspectives.
price exceeds these marginal water values, Producer C
will produce at exactly best point for the respective
turbines, unless the spot price happens to land between
the 0.125 EUR price gaps, thus interpolating the bids.
This is accomplished by setting two price points at the
smallest allowed interval apart combined with a sharp
increase in volume, leading effectively to almost
piecewise constant bidding curves, as opposed to
piecewise linear. Notice also how the producer bids best
point volume at the technical maximum price, implying
that the turbine best point is calibrated to lie at
maximum production.
Producers also purposely bid so as to control the
interpolation between price points. Bids with noticeable
gaps between price points and volume points can
represent a linear approximation of the falling efficiency
above best point. Table 3 below gives a real example of
a bid matrix generated by Producer A for a single power
station. The strategy in the bid is to allow for
interpolation whilst letting higher price levels balance
the loss of efficiency. Figure 4 illustrates this
graphically. The efficiency η in Table 3 is relative to
best point efficiency set at 1, and have been used to
calculate the necessary price levels to compensate for
respective efficiency loss of running above best point.
In Table 3 Producer A seems to want a
disproportionally high premium to produce at maximum
production. This sort of behavior is found in most of the
bid matrices for Producer A. This finding complies with
evidence for smaller bidders in Texas electricity market
[13]. The particular reservoir in this example had a
filling level of more than 90%, along with the other
reservoirs in the hydrological system. At this storage
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Table 2: Producer C uses neighboring price points to minimize the risk of interpolation of his hourly bids. Top row shows bid prices
in EUR/MWh, and table entries are in MW. Positive entries are purchases, and negative are sales. Water values in italics.
Hour\Price −263 41.875 42 46.625 43.75 56.25 56.375 58.625 58.75 2625
10 27.9 27.9 27.9 27.9 −16.6 −16.6 −16.6 −16.6 −34.8 −34.8
11 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 −16.5 −16.5 −16.5 −16.5 −34.7 −34.7
12 27.7 27.7 27.7 27.7 −16.8 −16.8 −16.8 −16.8 −35.0 −35.0
13 27.8 27.8 27.8 27.8 −16.7 −16.7 −16.7 −16.7 −34.9 −34.9
14 27.8 27.8 27.8 27.8 −16.7 −16.7 −16.7 −16.7 −34.9 −34.9
15 27.4 27.4 27.4 27.4 −17.1 −17.1 −17.1 −17.1 −35.3 −35.3
16 26.8 26.8 26.8 26.8 −17.7 −17.7 −17.7 −17.7 −35.9 −35.9
Table 3: Producer A setting strategic price points to allow and control interpolation, compensating for loss of efficiency above best
point by using higher price points, single turbine. Bid prices in top row are in EUR/MWh, and table entries are in MW, where
negative numbers indicate sales.
Hour\Price −263 32.25 46.38 52.50 2625
1 0 −28 −31 −35 −36
2 0 −28 −31 −35 −36
. . . . . .
24 0 –28 –31 –35 –36
Efficiencies relative to best point, η – 1 0.98 0.97 0.967
Price pts to compensate for η (32.25/η) – 32.25 32.88 33.25 33.38
Price
Volume
Entry price point
Best point
Max volume
Max price
Figure 4: Graphical display of an hourly bid for a single turbine.
The bid enters at the best point production level whereas the next
price point hits at maximum production. The linearly increasing
price between the two points should approximately balance the loss
of efficiency from best point to maximum production.
level, the turbines could run at full capacity for over
1700 hours without emptying the reservoir. Thus we
find this bidding pattern even more peculiar. Even if the
spot price should reach 1250 EUR/MWh the producer
will be allocated closer to 35 than 36 MWh, missing out
on large profits, however improbable. Producer A
explains this by their high price expectations regarding
the frequency controlled normal-run reserves market,
closer to real time. Thus Producer A wants a large
premium to dedicate all his production capacity to the
spot market.
We find similar bidding patterns for Producer B, yet
he charges a lesser premium to run at maximum
capacity. For Producer C we find that he does not charge
a premium over its best point production, simply
because the maximum production level is at, or very
close to, the best production for all its turbines (Table 2).
This simplifies the bidding process and allows the
producer to run at best point more frequently.
The lowest price point at which the producer starts
bidding to supply electricity is from here on referred to
as the entry price point. Below this point the producer
will be offering zero supply and perhaps submit demand
bids to cover other commitments cheaply. The entry
price point should consist of what the producer sees as
his marginal cost of production, including the marginal
water value, the feed-in fees, etc. Producers sometimes
let portions of the water in their reservoirs run through
their power stations no matter what the price level; this
is rational if the water cannot be stored. The producers
set the marginal value of this water to zero. Thus if they
can produce electricity from it at a price above their
power stations’ direct marginal cost, they will. If not,
they simply let water run through while disconnecting
the generators. The lowest price at which the producers
should bid for ‘non-storable’ production is henceforth
known as the break-even price point. This should also
include all marginal costs except the marginal water
value. Any time a producer for some reason employs the
break-even price point, this should also be the entry
price point, as a producer should never bid to produce
below the break-even price point.
Surprisingly, the producers often bid at the break-
even price point for water in flexible reservoirs. Our
study gives no conclusive answers to why they do this,
but in interviews they state it is most often due to the
reservoir situation in combination with the weather
forecast. Strangely, we find there is plenty of available
reservoir storage capacity in some of the periods when
the producer bids power at the break-even price point.
This implies that they see that a certain amount of water
must under all circumstances be released from the
reservoir. Yet, they value the remainder of the water in
the reservoir at a higher price. Thus they can be seen as
having two marginal water values, one at zero and one
usually in the range of 10’s of EUR/MWh. Table 4
shows an example of Producer A’s bids for an individual
power station where there seems to be two water values
in play. As in Table 3, Producer A charges a high
premium for higher volumes. This particular power
station is situated at the bottom of a cascade, so there
should be no incentive to release water simply to be able
to produce further downstream.
Some producers are more exposed to high feed-in
fees and have to take the fee into consideration more
than others when bidding. In certain areas during the
winter season the variable part of the fee can be as high
as 20% of the day-ahead price. Others experience the
variable part being close to 0% year around. The
variable part of the feed-in fee can thus comprise a
significant part of the direct marginal cost of production,
and have a great impact on the entry- and break-even
price points. Hence, we should be able to observe the
changing feed-in fee reflected in changing entry price
points. However, even though the marginal loss rate
used to calculate the feed-in fee is known, it is also
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Table 4: Producer A seemingly operating with two marginal water values for a single flexible reservoir, indicated from the use of
the break-even price point as well as much higher price points. Producer A bids to let water through at the break-even price point
of 3.75 EUR/MWh while bidding to produce more at much higher prices. The high premiums above 12.5 EUR/MWh are in line
with Table 3. Top row shows bid prices in EUR/MWh, while table entries are in MW, with negative numbers indicating sale.
Hour\Price −263 3.625 3.75 19.875 20 28.75 28.875 50 2625
1 0 0 −74 −74 −110 −110 −150 −165 −170
. 0 0 −74 −74 −110 −110 −150 −165 −170
24 0 0 −74 −74 −110 −110 −150 −165 −170
dependent on the unknown price the next day. Producers
can therefore at best use their price forecasts for the next
day to predict the variable feed-in fee. We use the same
price forecast as Producer A had in hand when setting
price points for the next day. The marginal loss rates are
multiplied with the average price forecast, respectively
between 06:00–22:00 and 22:00–06:00, to obtain
forecasted variable feed-in fees for daytime and for the
night. In this example, the change in the forecasted
variable feed-in fee over a day is well reflected in
Producer A’s bidding for an individual power station, as
seen in Table 5 below.
This example illustrates how a producer ideally
should match the variable feed-in fee with the entry
price point. Yet, this not often the case for the producers
in this study. The marginal loss rate can vary
significantly from week to week and within any
weekday, thus we should see a corresponding change in
the entry price points the producers employ in their bid
matrices. An example of where the change in the
variable feed-in fee is not taken into account is presented
below in Tables 6 and 7. In the example, Producer A
bids to produce at 0.125 EUR/MWh, below the feed-in
fee alone and thus below his break-even point. Neither
does he change the entry price point according to change
in the marginal loss rate from hour 6 to 7. This will
cause a direct loss to the producer if the spot price
should land below 2.75 EUR/MWh. Most likely is the
feed-in fee not taken well into account in the higher
price points either, thus causing a loss taking the
marginal water value into account. The bid can therefore
be said to be irrational. To improve the bid, the producer
can simply bid at lower price points at night and at
higher price points during the day according to the
changing feed-in fees.
4.2.3. Choosing the bid type
The choice between bidding hourly bids or block bids,
with or without links, is perhaps the most complex
decision the bidding responsible has to deal with.
Linked block bids are block bids that are conditional on
another block being accepted, i.e. the linked block bid
only becomes valid if the parent block is accepted. The
idea of allowing block bidding is to give producers with
startup costs and other inflexibilities a predictable
production schedule. An advantage stated by our set of
producers is being able to set the exact best point
production directly at the marginal water value. Simply
put, an average spot price above the marginal cost gives
the most efficient production, and a price below means
no production. Such practise can be seen as rational and
is a common way to submit block bids.
A common strategy is to combine hourly bids with
block bids, submitting the block bid at best point and the
marginal water value, while the hourly bids cover the
production from best point to maximum production at
higher price points. Often the producers find that spot
prices hover around the marginal water value, so that
hourly bidding will result in many startups, which is not
desirable.
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Table 5: Change in variable feed-in fee reflected well in Producer A’s entry price points. The average forecasted change in the
variable feed-in fee is very near the change in Producer A’s use of entry price point.
Day Night Difference
Approx. marginal loss Rate −5% 20% 25%
Entry price points [EUR/MWh] 35 26.88 8.125
Average variable feed-fee [EUR/MWh] 6.94 −1.64 8.49
Table 6: Average feed-in fees seen by Producer A in relation to
Table 7.
Day Night
Approx. marginal loss rate 3% −3%
Average variable feed-in fee 14.1 −12.9
Average total feed-in fee 22.1 −4.9
Table 7: Bid matrix showing irrational bidding as the entry
price point (in italics) is below the feed-in fee alone, shown in
Table 6. First row numbers are in EUR/MWh, while table
entries are in MW, with negative numbers indicating sales.
Hour −263 0 0.125 75 87.5 2625
1 0 0 −8 −8 −11 −11
. 0 0 −8 −8 −11 −11
24 0 0 −8 −8 −11 −11
Nord Pool Spot gives participants the possibility of
submitting up to 100 block bids per day, where the
blocks can be any consecutive combination of minimum
three hours. The latter implies there are ∑22n =1 n = 253
possible combinations to choose from. However the
producers rather use a few combinations of hours that
give practical meaning with regards to peak and off-peak
price hours, working shifts and feed-in costs, and stick to
simple rules when making block bids. Blocks are usually
submitted sequentially in time, with the overlap often
taking place at the shift of the marginal loss rate at 06:00,
or according to work shifts around 07:00–09:00.
The application of bid types varies quite a lot between
the three producers. Table 8 shows the volume share of the
two main bidtypes submitted and realized over 8 weeks by
the three producers. The producers each submit a sizeable
share of block bids, which drop quite a bit once the bids
are actually realized in Elspot. Producer B submits 27% of
the total volume in block bids, but only 6% are actually
realized. Producer C is the most noteworthy in terms of the
volume of block bids used, submitting 71% of his capacity
in the spot market in blocks. A total of 60% was still
realized and produced as block bids. Producer C gives no
other reasons for submitting block bids than what we have
already mentioned, mainly bidding blocks to avoid starts
and stops. However, Producer C’s largest power station
comprises a sizeable portion of his total capacity and is
almost exclusively bid in using blocks.
4.3. Performance analysis
To find the potential increase in income for the producers,
we perform an analysis of a case where the producers are
able to predict every price peak within each two week
period. In other words, we simulate having perfect
foresight for the entire period, and producing at maximum
bided capacity in the hours with the highest spot prices.
Given the limited technical and hydrological data on two
of the producers some simplifications were necessary. We
assume the producers’ capacity to deliver to the spot
market is given by the sum of its hourly and block bids
submitted for each hour. We aggregate the total volume of
flexible electricity produced over each two week period,
meaning we have subtracted bid volumes we consider less
than fully flexible, i.e. bids at breakeven price points.
Thus the remaining volume should be 100% flexible. This
energy is then reallocated to the highest priced hours until
the total amount is allocated, where we assume we
achieve the same average efficiency of the turbines. This
is of course a somewhat unfair analysis as it disregards
both the start up costs, the reservoir levels and the
potentially lower efficiency achieved from always
running at maximum capacity. Yet it does paint a picture,
and to a certain degree, the analysis can give an indication
of the producers’ bidding performance. This is displayed
in Table 9 below.
We see that the producers perform quite well,
competing against perfect price information. The
highest potential increase in income over the six periods
is 11.1%. On average over the 8 weeks, the potential
increase for all producers was 5.4%. Producer A
displayed a more stable performance than B and C. For
Producer C in week 38–39 there was very low net trade
due to low price levels, making this analysis less
interesting. We observe that all producers on average
performed best in week 13–14. Producers A and B had
their weakest performance in week 38–39, and all had
their second poorest results in week 25–26. Clearly,
there is some correlation between producers’
performance. It appears to be easier to perform closer to
the upper bound in the spring and winter weeks, than in
the summer and autumn weeks. In Table 10 we have
calculated the standard deviation of the zonal price
relative to the average price in the respective periods.
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Table 8: Volume share of hourly bids and block bids submitted
by and realized for Producers A, B and C over 8 weeks.
Producer A B C
Hourly bids submitted 76% 70% 29%
Block bids submitted 24% 30% 71%
Hourly bids realized 87% 94% 40%
Block bids realized 13% 6% 60%
Table 9: Potential increase in actual realized income in each two week period given complete knowledge of future price levels.
Week 13–14 Week 25–26 Week 38–39 Week 51–52
Producer A 5.2% 5.8% 9.4% 5.8%
Producer B 1.2% 7.3% 11.1% 3.2%
Producer C 0.4% 6.2% – 3.7%
Average 5.4%
The price deviations indicate that the higher the volatility
in prices, the more difficult it is to bid optimally and take
advantage of the high prices in a period.
5. Comparison with Optimization-Based Bids
We implement the two-stage stochastic programming
model in [9] for Producer A, in order to compare actual
bids with optimized bids. The next subsection explains
assumptions used in the model setup, while Section 5.2
discusses the results. See the appendix for details.
5.1. Case description
The system has four reservoirs and five power stations.
Inflow is assumed deterministic, while price scenarios
were generated based on data on forecast errors, where
forecasts were gathered from SKM Market Predictor, a
market analysis company. In particular, price scenarios
are constructed as a normal distribution around these
forecasts with a standard deviation equal to that of the
area spot price for the respective hour 40 weekdays or 16
weekend days back in time. An example of 500 generated
price scenarios for day-ahead is displayed in Figure 5.
The efficiency curves are based on the producer’s
records of measured water flow versus power output.
The need for a linear formulation is taken care of by
linearly approximating the efficiency curves for each
turbine. The efficiency curve is usually concave within
the turbine’s operating range. The slope of the line
stretching from the origin represents the best point
conversion rate. This is displayed in Figure 6. Each
turbine is also modeled with a minimum output, which
in the figure is where the thick unbroken curve begins.
The model is run with 300 scenarios over a two week
horizon. We focus on day-ahead bidding for two particular
days, 25 and 26 September 2011. In the optimization we
bound the end-of-horizon reservoir level to match the
realized one, making sure the optimization uses the same
amount of water as was used in actual operation. We use
only hourly bids and block bids; linked block bids are
excluded to make the results more interpretable. For the
same reason we exclude participation in intraday,
balancing or ancillary services markets.
Feed-in fees are included in order to reflect time-
varying transmission costs, and bid price points
(parameters set in advance) are set using efficiency
curves and actual water values when such are available,
International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol. 07 2015 47
Erik Nicholas Alnaes Roger Blikra Grøndahl Stein-Erik Fleten and Trine Krogh Boomsma
Table 10: Standard deviation of zonal price relative to average price in period, showing a certain correlation to the producers
potential to increase income shown in Table 9.
Week 13–14 Week 25–26 Week 38–39 Week 51–52
Producer A 8% 23% 41% 28%
Producer B 7% 22% 39% 15%
Producer C 6% 23% 41% 28%
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Figure 5: Plot of 500 generated price scenarios for day-ahead NO3
spot prices, 05.04.2011.
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Figure 6: Linear approximations of efficiency curve formulated as
conversion from water flow to output power. Minimum and
maximum production is indicated by the location of the solid line.
besides making sure that bid points are located closely
where the price scenarios are dense.
In summary, we set up and solve a two-stage
stochastic programming model for the bidding problem
of Producer A.
5.2. Implementation and results
The model is implemented in XPRESS 7.2.1 on a PC
with 4x3.4GHz i7 processors and 16 GB RAM. Typical
solution time is 1000 seconds for 300 scenarios for a
problem having a two week horizon.
5.2.1. Actual Bids and Model-Generated Bids for 
25 Sep
The aggregated actual power station bids and the model-
generated bids are displayed below in Figure 7,
respectively. The bids are roughly equal for all hours. The
price axes have been cut from 60 EUR/MWh to make the
figures readable. Worth noting first and foremost is the
difference in entry price points. Whereas the actual bids
place the first volume of 14MW already at 1.4 EUR, the
model generates its first bid volume of 40MW at 7.20
EUR. The marginal loss rate for the likely power station
with a capacity of 15 MW, is 9.4% this weekend. This
implies a total feed-in cost of C feed = π × Cm1r + Cfixed
= 1.4 × 0.094 + 1.1 = 1.23 EUR/MWh produced if the
spot price turns out to be 1.4 EUR. Most likely this
reservoir has a marginal water value above 0.17
EUR/MWh, and thus the bid is irrational. The generated
bids are not that easily split up into power station bids,
and thus the same analysis can not be done. However
through searching the model for a scenario price
neighboring 7.20 EUR, we see that the total feed-in costs
are 67.04 EUR, implying an average average realized
feed-in cost of 1.68 EUR/MWh. This implies a water
value of 5.52 EUR/MWh. And with all reservoirs being
far from full, and an average price forecast of 24.9 EUR,
this too is irrational bidding. However, if a water flow
constraint is binding, this sort of instance might occur. 
The figures also show that the model generates a
higher hourly bid at maximum price. This comes from the
fact that in addition to the hourly bids, the producer has
also submitted block bids for this day, given in Table 11.
The model has not used any block bids, so adding in
block volumes, the two bids equal approximately at a
maximum volume of 217 MW. However the actual bids
only max to 217 MW for the first 9 hours of the day. We
can not find any good reasons why the bid volumes
should drop to 215 MW for the remainder of the day,
and thus see it as irrational bidding behavior.
5.2.2. Out of Sample Comparison
We run the actual bids through the same model instance
that generated the comparing bids, but with new price
scenarios, to see how they perform under uncertainty. The
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Figure 7: Bids for Sunday 25.09.2011 from Producer A and the bidding model, respectively. The price axes have been cut from 2000
EUR/MWh to make the figures readable.
Table 11: Actual block bids of 25.09.2011 for the hydropower
system in question. Notice how the three block bids do not
equal in volume, even though the hourly bids are constant
throughout the day. Volumes are in MW and prices are in
EUR/MWh.
Start Stop Volume Price Block
00:00 09:00 −23 33.5 B0009
09:00 20:00 −21 35.5 B0920
20:00 24:00 −21 35.5 B2024
results are displayed in 12. The actual bids end up with a
little less generated output, but not enough to justify the
loss in spot revenues. The average price achieved is 24.95
EUR/MWh, compared to the generated bids’ 26.79
EUR/MWh. We also see that the start-up costs are greater
for the actual bids than the generated ones, even though
the former use block bids. This can attributed to the fact
that the model optimizes bidding for all five stations
combined, whereas the actual bids have been constructed
as bids for the individual stations. We conclude there is
room for optimization-based improvements in bidding.
5.2.3. Backtest
For reference we also include a similar table with a one-
scenario run-through of actual spot prices, Table 13. We
see that the generated bids still outperform the actual
bids. The realized spot prices for 25 Sep turned out to be
quite a lot higher than the forecast and thus the resulting
numbers go up. The start-up costs are assumed to be
equal 400 EUR/start-up for all turbines, thus the number
of start-ups are easily recognized. Still, even though the
empirical block bid is accepted, the generated bids
achieve less startups through using hourly bids only.
5.2.4. Actual and Model-Generated Bids from 26 Sep
The resulting reservoir levels from 25.09.2011 was input
as starting reservoirs for 26.09.2011. The aggregated
actual power station bids as well as the bids generated
by the model, are displayed below in Figure 8. The
actual hourly bid from Producer A is identical to the bid
from 25.09.2011. The bids generated on the other hand
are split in two periods, displayed as the dashed line plot
for 06:00-22:00 and the continuous line for the other 8
hours. Now notice how the generated bids clearly differ
in entry price points for the two plots. This reflects
perfectly the fact that 26.09.2011 was a Monday and the
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Table 12: Results from fixing bids as parameters to the model with 300 price scenarios. Note that the price scenarios are not the
same that generated the bottom row bids. All numbers are averaged from the scenario realizations. Output is given in MW, and the
other numbers in EUR.
Bids Output Spot income Start-up costs Feed-in costs Profit
Actual 3 803 94 882 1 036 3 768 90 078
Generated 3 832 102 654 706 3 974 97 973
Table 13: Running results from fixing bids as parameters to the model with actual spot prices for 25.09.2011. Output is given in
MW, and the other numbers in EUR.
Bids Output Spot income Start-up costs Feed-in costs Profit
Actual 3 895 118 775 1 200 4 567 113 008
Generated 3 944 120 557 800 4 637 115 120
Price [EUR/MWh]
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Figure 8: Bids for 26.09.2011 from from Producer A and the bidding model, respectively. The price axes have been cut from 2000
EUR/MWh to make the figures readable.
marginal loss rates now vary intraday. The continuous
line consequently enters at an earlier price than the
dashed line which implies a lower feed-in cost. This
makes perfect sense, seeing that all the power stations in
question had a lower marginal loss rate for the night
hours than the day hours.
The figures show that the model still generates a
higher hourly bid at maximum price. The difference in
volumes are made up for through the first of the block
bids given in Table 14. However, the irrationality
continues also here as the volumes for the other blocks
do not equal the first. The change from 09:00 to 07:00 in
the bidded blocks reflect the change from weekend to
weekday, which again can relate both to peak hours for
prices and the actual work shifts of the power stations.
5.2.5. Out of Sample Comparison
Once more, we run the actual bids through the same
model input that generated the comparing bids, but with
new price scenarios. The results on how the bids deal with
new stochasticity are displayed in Table 15. Again the
generated bids do better than the actual ones. It should be
this way though, seeing that the optimal bids were gen-
erated using the same model and a price scenario set with
the same properties. The average price achieved is 27.55
EUR/MWh, compared to the generated bids’ 28.09
EUR/MWh. The start-up costs however, are in fact higher
for the received bids than for the generated ones. The only
conlusion we draw from this is that the model does not
weigh start-up costs very heavily, neither should it, seeing
that the estimated and used cost per start-up of 400 EUR
is less than 0.4% of the spot revenues.
5.2.6. Backtest
A similar table with a one-scenario run-through of actual
spot prices is shown in Table 16. Now the actual bids
gives way more output than the generated ones. What
happens is that the actual bids naturally hits the exact
water usage values per station as they were set based on
the bids and efficency curves. The generated bids on the
other hand now used a too high price forecast in
generating new price forecasts, so that when the spot
realizes way below forecast the commitments become
way too low. The model hits the water usage per station,
as it must, but does it through spilling whatever water it
cannot produce. The average realized spot prices for 26
Sep are 36.7 EUR/MWh and 37.0 EUR/MWh,
respectively, for actual and generated bids. The
generated bids now do one more start-up, and we
conclude that comparing actual bids to the model bids
and getting unambiguous results is easier said than done.
5.2.7. Simulation: Stochastic Versus Deterministic
In Section 4.3 we showed that Producer A could have
increased their week 13–14 period income by 5.2%
given complete knowledge of future price levels.
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Table 14: Block bids for 26.09.2011 for the hydropower system
in question. The volumes blocked are not equal for all hours.
Volumes are in MW and prices are in EUR/MWh.
Start Stop Volume Price Block
00:00 07:00 −23 33.5 B0009
07:00 20:00 −22 35.5 B0920
20:00 24:00 −21 35.5 B0920
Table 15: Running results from inputting bids as parameters to the model with 300 price scenarios. Note that the price scenarios are
not the same that generated the bottom row bids. All numbers are averaged from the scenario realizations. Output is given in MW,
and the other numbers in EUR.
Bids Output Spot revenue Start-up costs Feed-in costs Profit
Actual 3 762 103 633 1 744 4 116 97 773
Generated 3 799 106 731 2 001 4 239 100 491
Table 16: Running results from inputting bids as parameters to the model with actual spot prices for 26.09.2011. Output is given in
MW, and the other numbers in EUR
Bids Output Spot revenue Start-up costs Feed-in costs Profit
Actual 4 113 146 738 1 200 5 827 139 711
Generated 3 270 121 021 1 600 4 657 116 367
Running a similar test for the single five-station cascade
shows a 1.6% potential in increased income. In the
following, we test to see how much profit the model can
realize through the same period, testing both with a
300–scenario model and a 1-scenario deterministic
model with price forecasts. The model is run iteratively
for each day, first with price forecasts and free bid
variables, then with actual prices and fixed bid
parameters. The first day of running actual reservoir
levels are used as initial levels, while the end-of period
reservoir levels is fixed at the real end level. This initial
run will generate bids that are put back into the model
again, but now with actual prices for the first day. Now,
the reservoir levels at h = 24 from this fixed-bid real-
prices run are given as input to the next day’s model run,
where all other parameters are updated as the time span
H is reduced by 24 hours. This way we run through the
model a total of 14 times, every other time being with
fixed bids and real prices. 64 price points are used and
40 different blocks are possible to bid at every day, and
every stochastic run uses 300 price scenarios based
around the day-ahead forecast.
The results in Table 17 show that total profit over 14
days is 1.9% greater for the generated bids. Such a small
number and with only one run-through is not enough to
draw any conclusions. Yet we would like to point out
our suspicion that the bidding design is such that we see
the need to model short term price uncertainty to that
great an extent. The stochastic model ends up realizing
higher total start-up costs than the deterministic model.
A possible explanation for this is again the fact that the
stochastic model allocates a lot of total bid volumes to
block bids, which may not be accepted in the
deterministic real price run. In fact 23.6% of the block
volumes are rejected. Thus the model may need to shut
down turbines as their volume was set aside for block
production. The huge variance in daily feed-in costs can
be explained to a large extent by the two weekends
present. Excluding the weekends gives standard
deviations of 15% and 13% for the stochastic and
deterministic model, respectively.
Also worth noticing from Table 17 is the relatively
higher standard deviation in the deterministic model run.
The actual revenue increase compared to reality was
minuscule 0.4% and -0.2%, for the stochastic and
deterministic run-throughs respectively. We believe the
improvement would have been higher if the prices and
price forecasts had not been so stable.
As of the 1.6% potential improvement shown in
Section 4.3, a deterministic run of the model with actual
spot prices gives an increase in income of 0.9%, which
confirms that the value of perfect information cannot be
very high for this particular case. We have not run tests
through the entire 14 days with actual bids to find a
profit for comparison, however find it likely that this
potential increase would be higher.
In summary, four results are noted; first, optimized
and actual bid curves are qualitatively similar, lending
International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol. 07 2015 51
Erik Nicholas Alnaes Roger Blikra Grøndahl Stein-Erik Fleten and Trine Krogh Boomsma
Table 17: Results from running an iterative 14-day comparison between the stochastic and deterministic model. The standard
deviations are given as a percentage of average. Prices are given in Euros, while costs, incomes and profits are given in 1000 Euros.
Finally, volumes are in MWs.
Stochastic Deterministic
Average Total St.dev Average Total St.dev
Price forecast 60.55 – 6.3% 60.55 – 6.3%
Actual spot price 60.52 – 6.2% 60.52 – 6.2%
Spot revenue 234.2 3 280 11% 230.2 3 222 24%
Feed-in cost 1.6 22.8 34% 2.0 28.6 127%
Start-up cost 1.3 18.1 8.3% 1.0 14.0 60%
Profit 231.3 3 239 13% 227.1 3 180 22%
# unique volumes 97 – 35% 15 – 22%
# unique price 49 – 14% 11 – 33%
# block bids 24 – 36% 0 – –
# blocks used 15 – 28% 0 – –
Avg. bids per block 2 – 17% 0 – –
Avg. vol. per block 18 – 66% 0 – –
Tot. vol. bid as block 1 832 25 648 31% 0 – –
Block commitment 1 399 19 592 38% 0 – –
empirical support to the model of [9]. Second, the entry
price point for the actual bids are too low and do not
reflect reasonable marginal water values including
transmission tariffs. This is consistent with the empirical
analysis in the previous section. Third, at high volumes,
the actual bids require higher prices than the optimized
bids. One may ask whether the widespread use of such a
practice may lead to higher prices than necessary in
scarcity situations (and explain why economists tend to
find empirical evidence of ‘non-competitive’ markups
of prices over marginal costs [18].). Further, the actual
bids imply a maximum production that decreases after
the first seven hours of the day. Finally, using out-of-
sample scenarios, the optimized bids give a revenue that
is higher by 1.9%. It outperforms the actual bidding also
in terms of start up costs, even though the actual bids
contain block bids, while the optimization model do not.
It seems that the optimization model is able to exploit
the capability of the joint system of power stations; the
actual bids are made from adding bids from individual
power stations.
6. Conclusion
This analysis gives insight into how day-ahead bidding
is done in practice, and as such provides a basis for
improved system operation. The most decisive factors
when bidding are the marginal water value, feed-in fees,
technical and hydrological characteristics, and bilateral
agreements outside the spot market. We find that the
producers take some of these factors well into account,
and others not always so well. Among the things they
consider well are the efficiency curves of the turbines
and that they must choose to strategically interpolate or
avoid it, as to hit suitable points of the efficiency curve.
The feed-in fees are not taken as well into account.
Producers’ entry price points do not always adapt to
changes in the variable feed-in fee over the course of a
weekday, and some bids are submitted at price points
below the feed-in fee alone. We also find that the
producers do not fully utilize the range of price points
allowed.
The producers perform quite well in their bidding, as
indicated by the analysis of the maximum potential
increase in spot revenues. On average over the 8 weeks,
the potential increase for all producers was 5.4%,
competing against perfect price information. This comes
both from the fact that price forecasts are generally
good, and that the system design with several price-
volume bids and uniform spot prices is well-
functioning. We still find that their performance
correlates with the standard deviation of the price levels,
meaning it is more difficult to bid optimally when price
variations are high.
The overall conclusion is that bidding is not always
rational, but that the consequences of this are often
limited. There is room for improved bidding, e.g.
through optimization approaches, however, the potential
gains in average profit over time are likely to be modest.
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A Model for Optimal Bidding of Hydropower
This section presents a version of the [9] model to
optimize day-ahead bidding given price scenarios for a
given period forward in time as well as reservoir levels
at the period’s start and end. The mathematical
formulation of the model, with parameters, variables,
constraints and objectives is given in Section A.1.
Notational conventions To help the readability of the
model, indices are always defined by small single latin
letters. Sets have capital letters in a calligraphic font,
with potential controlling subscripted index and/or
superscripted letters to point out that it is a subset of
special characteristics. Parameters are defined similar to
sets, except with a regular font. All decision variables
are lower case single latin letters, with lower case
controlling subscripts. For reference the units used on
parameters and decision variables in the implementation
are included in the descriptions that follow.
A.1 Mathematical formulation
Sets and indices The model has a generic
formulation with regard to reservoirs, power stations
and turbines. The following sets and indices are used
consequently in the modeling.
S : Set of scenarios, indexed by s, sized to S
H: Set of all hours the model spans over,
indexed by h, sized to H
I: Set of bidpoints, indexed by i
B : Set of possible blocks, indexed by b
R : Set of reservoirs, indexed by r
K: Set of power stations, indexed by k
T: Set of turbines, indexed by t
Et : Set of efficiency segments for turbine t,
indexed by e
Subsets The model is split up into one day-
ahead part that is directly related to the bidding and one
part for the coming days, that will not need bidding.
Thus the hour resolution is also split up into two subsets
corresponding to the two model types. The other subsets
relate to the topography and positioning of reservoirs
and turbines.
HD ⊆ H: Set of hours for the day-ahead bidding
HL ⊆ H: Set of hours for long term part 
Kr ⊆ K: Subset of power stations that tap water
from reservoir r
Kr+ ⊆ K: Subset of power stations directly above
reservoir r
Tk⊆ T: Subset of turbines in power station k 
Parameters The constants and coefficients given as
parameters in the model are stated below. Notice that the
price points for hourly bids and block bids are the same. 
Also note that the capacity of a turbine is time dependent.
πsh: Area spot price for scenario s in hour h
[EUR/MWh]
ρs: Probability of scenario s
Pi: Price at bidpoint i [EUR/MWh]
Pbi: Price for block b at bidpoint i [EUR/MWh]
Bb
start: The first hour of block b
Bb
end: The last hour of block b
Bsb
ave: Average spot price for block b in scenario s
[EUR/MWh]
Wht
cap: Maximum output from turbine t in hour h
[MW]
Wt
min: Minimum output from turbine t [MW]
Ete: Efficiency for turbine t and segment e [MW]
Ete
0: Efficiency constant for turbine t and
segment e [Wh/m3]
Qhk
min: Minimum flow for power station k in hour h
[Mm3/h]
Cshk
feed: Feed-in fee for station k in scenario s and
hour h [EUR/MWh]
Ct
start: Start-up cost for turbine t [EUR]
R0r : Initial reservoir level of r [Mm3]
Rrmax: Maximum reservoir level in r [Mm3]
Rrmin: Minimum reservoir level in r [Mm3]
Rrend: Final end-of-period reservoir level in r
[Mm3]
Fhr: Inflow to reservoir r in hour h [Mm3/h]
Decision variables The variables can be split up into
two groups, the ones related to the bids and the ones
related to the actual water flow. The x-variables are the
sole variables not dependent on scenario, and thus the
only first-stage variables. All other variables are
second-stage recourse variables.
xhi : Volume bid in hour h at bidpoint i [MW]
xˆbi : Volume bid for block b and bidpoint i [MW]
ysh : Commitment for hourly bids in scenario s and
hour h [MW]
yˆ sb : Commitment from block bid b in scenario s
[MW]
wsht : Power output from turbine t in scenario s and
hour h [MW]
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qsht : Flow through turbine t in scenario s and hour
h [Mm3/h]
qˆ shk : Flow through power station k in scenario s
and hour h [Mm3/h]
lshr : Reservoir level of r in scenario s and hour h
[Mm3]
Objective function The objective maximizes the total
revenues from day-ahead and the period to come, less
costs associated with start-ups and feed-in fees.
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(3)
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(22)
(23)
(24)
The objective function, (1) to (3), is the probability-
weighted sum of profit in all scenarios, both for the day-
ahead part and for the long term part. It includes the
costs associated with feed-in fees and start-up costs for
the turbines. The latter would naturally push production
away from day-ahead towards the rest the period, such
as to avoid the costs of binary start-up variables. To
make up for this shift we include a factor β, calibrated
to compensate for this through assuring an equal output
for all days, relative to the price forecast.
Constraint (4) reflects a rule given by the market
operator making their problem easier to solve. It states
that all bids have to be strictly non-decreasing, thus
making sure a producer cannot bid totally stepwise
constant bids, as discussed in Section 4.2.2. It also
prohibits a decreasing hourly bid volume with rising
prices, which otherwise might occur if block bids are bid
in at a certain price or if participants are in possess of
market power. Due to the previous constraint (4) the
interpolation to the correct committed volumes is done
as easily as in (5). Setting the commitment for each
scenario based on scenario-independent bid variables
also functions as the non-anticipativity constraint of the
stochastic model.
Eq. (6) commits production from block bids if the
price is below the average realized spot price. Constraint
(7) makes sure the model never bids such that total
volumes from hourly bids and block bids are greater
than the combined turbine capacity in any hour. The
sum of production in all turbines have to equal total
commitment from hourly bids and block bids, expressed
through (8).
Constraints (9) to (11) set the binary variables, while
(12) says that hour 24 is related to hour 1. The latter
states that if the turbine is not running in hour 24, then it
needs to start to be able to run in hour 1. This is included
to discourage the model from doing more start-ups in the
earlier hours of the day than the later hours. If a turbine
is running one night, it is not unlikely that it will run the
next night as well.
γ δ
sht sht
s h t, { , }, , ,∈ ∈ ∈ ∈0 1 S H T
w q q l
s h k t r
sht sht shk shr
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x x y y y s h i b
hi bi sh sb sh
, ˆ , , ˆ , , , , ,≥ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈0 S H I B A turbine cannot deliver more power than its
capacity, (13). The conversion from output power to
water flow through the turbine is simplified through the
linearizations of efficiency in equation (14).
Approximations et of the conversion rate from water
flow to output power are given through the Y-axis
intercept at E 0te and a slope of Ete. Constraints (15) and
(16) sum the flow through all turbines in power station k
and bounds it to be equal to or higher than an hourly
dependent minimum flow.
Eq. (17)-(20) control the reservoir levels and (21)
states how the reservoir levels in the final hour have to
equal the input end-of-period reservoir levels. Notice
how there is no explicit modeling of potential spill over
reservoirs. As we will not analyze spill any further, it
would only enter the model as an increase in the
upwards unbounded q variable.
A.2 Input parameters
This subsection will elaborate on the generation of input
parameters for the model runs that are included in the
results.
Price scenarios We have received historical day-
ahead price forecasts from SKM Market Predictor AS
for all the days in question, denoted by πh h ∈Hd. Price
scenarios have been constructed as a normal distribution
based around these forecasts with a standard deviation
σh equal to that of the area spot price for the respective
hour 40 weekdays or 16 weekend days back in time. For
the first day-ahead hour all scenarios will be normally
distributed around the price forecast. Given that in a
scenario s the price πsh misses the forecast for hour h by 
(25)
then the expectation for hour h +1 in same scenario s
will be
(26)
Thus we have
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where the cumulative distribution function is
(29)
Since we only possess day-ahead forecasts, the
forecast for days to come, πh h ∈HL have been assumed
φ
π
( ) exp /x dxx
x
= −
−∞∫
1
2
2 2
to equal the day-ahead forecast, πh h ∈HD, for the
remainder of the period, adjusting to weekends and
weekdays according to average weekend versus
weekday ratios for 2010. When going several days
forward, we have also used a steadily increasing weight
towards the forecasts to make sure the scenarios do not
go way out of hand. An example of 500 generated price
scenarios for day-ahead is displayed in Figure 5.
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